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CASE COMMENTS
ADOPTION: TWICE-ADOPTED CHILD AS HEIR
OF FIRST ADOPTER

In re Carpenter'sEstate, 41 N.W.2d 849 (Mich. 1950)
Appellee was adopted a second time after divorce of her first adoptive parents. Twelve years later her first adoptive mother died, whereupon appellee contended that she was entitled to the estate as decedent's heir at law. The probate court denied her claim; the circuit
court reversed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan, reinstating
the probate court denial and following its own decision In re Kiapp's
Estate,' H=D, the second adoption superseded the first for purposes
of inheritance.
When the second adoption follows the death of the first adopter,
the right to inherit from the first adopter is uniformly held to have
matured at his death.2 A second adoption during the lifetime of the
first adopter, however, has evoked conflicting holdings. Michigan is
joined by Oklahoma alone in the position taken in the principal case;
and even the Michigan court now indicates a dissatisfaction with its
previous holding exceeded only by its reluctance to overrule a

precedent relied upon in intestacy proceedings. The courts of Iowa,4
Kansas,6 Kentucky, 6 Tennessee, 7 Washington," and New South Wales,9
on the other hand, interpret the typical statute' ° to mean that adop1197 Mich. 615, 164 N.W. 881 (1917).
2
Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N.E. 993 (1896); Russell v. Russell,
14 Ky. L. 236 (1892); In re Sutton, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N.W. 925 (1925).
3
1n re Talley's Estate, 188 Okla. 338, 109 P.2d 495 (1941).
4
Holmes v. Curl, 189'Iowa 246, 178 N.W. 406 (1920).
5
Dreyer v. Sehrick, 105 Kan. 495, 185 Pac. 80 (1919).
6Villier v. Watson, 168 Ky. 631, 182 S.W. 869 (1916).
7
Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294, 409 S.W.2d 859 (1948).
8
1n re Egley, 16 Wash.2d 681, 134 P.2d 948 (1943).
9
public
Trustee v. Ferguson, 57 W.N. (N.S:W.) 63 (1940).
10FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1949): "An adopted child, whether adopted under the
laws of Florida or of any other state or country, shall be an heir at law, and for
the purpose of inheritance, shall be regarded as a lineal descendant of his adopting
parents, and the adopting parents shall inherit from the adopted child. Such
adopted child shall inherit the estate of his blood parents but such blood parents
shall not inherit from such adopted child." Statutes involved in the principal case
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tion irrevocably creates the status of parent and child for purposes of
inheritance, and that the adoptee's right can be divested by nothing
short of a successful attack on the validity of the original adoption
decree."
The rationale of the majority seems preferable to the Michigan
view. A child adopted only once is an heir of both his natural and
adoptive parents, although only the latter inherit from him. 1 2 His
succession can be avoided by the simple expedient of making a will. 13
In the absence of such expression, he has a stronger moral claim than
others to insist that his right to inherit, incident to a valid decree
of adoption, be protected from destruction by a subsequent collateral
proceeding. This principle is as fair to the first adopter as it is to
the natural parent. In some states the adopted child is no longer an
heir of the natural parent, and accordingly the variation in treatment
arising out of the fortuitous distinction between birth and adoption
is eliminated. 1 4 There is, however, a basic and sound reason for preserving to an adopted child his right to inherit from more than one
type of parent. He has lost the benefit of living with his blood parents,
a benefit widely recognized as a very real advantage. An additional
right on the purely material side helps in some measure to offset this
loss.
Adherence to the majority view allows the court to consider its
primary objective, the welfare and training of the child, without fear
of thereby revoking a property right previously granted in another
proceeding between different parties.' 5 The conflict among American
jurisdictions may prompt the Florida Legislature to speak. If it does
and the cases cited in notes 1, 3, 4-8 supra are of similar import and are set out

in the opinions. In England the adopted child is not an heir of the adopter,
Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 GEO. V., c. 29, §5.
"This is the rationale of the cases cited in notes 4-8 supra; cf. Ennis v.
Giblin, 147 Fla. 113, 2 So.2d 382 (1941).
12

FLA. STAT.

§§731.30, 72.22, 72.30 (1949).

13The first adopter may, of course, lack testamentary capacity. The new

Florida minimum support requisites and their relation to disinheritance are
discussed supra in Legis., 3 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 232 (1950).
' 4 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §257 (Deering 1941); CONN. GEN. STAT. §689
(Supp. 1935); D.C. CODE §16-205 (1941); LA. GEN. STAT. §§4839.31, 9734.6
(Dart 1939); PA. STAT. tit. 20, §§101, 102 (1941); for a thorough general treatment see Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted Child, 28
WASH. U.L.Q. 221 (1943).

15See In re Brock, 157 Fla. 291, 294, 25 So.2d 659, 662 (1946); cf. In re

McLaughlin, 159 Fla. 16, 30 So.2d 632 (1948).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1950], Art. 8
CASE COMMENTS

not, the customary solicitude of the Supreme Court of Florida for the
interests of minor children 16 and the numerical weight of authority,
as well as the reluctance of the Michigan court in paying its tribute
to stare decisis in the principal case, 7should influence the Florida
Court to align itself with the majority.
RoBERT FowNEY

EQUITY:

RIGHT OF VENDEE TO RETAIN POSSESSION

PENDING A DECREE FOR RESCISSION
Hilerio v. Barton, 42 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1949)
The complainants, who brought suit for rescission of a contract
for the purchase of real property, alleged fraudulent representations
by the vendors. They also requested that a lien be declared on the
realty for that part of the purchase price paid. The vendeecomplainants entered possession upon making a down payment on
the purchase price. The complainants further alleged that they
stood ready to vacate the premises when reimbursed by the vendor
respondents or as ordered by the court. The circuit court entered
an order requiring them to vacate. On certiorari, HEI=, a vendee in
equity seeking rescission of a contract because of fraud may retain
possession of the property pending suit if he offers to return it in
compliance with the decree he seeks. Order of the circuit court
quashed.
The courts have given increased attention to the law of rescission
in recent years as a result of increasing transactions in both land
and personalty. Out of the older cases arose the general proposition
that ordinarily a complainant must abandon possession before he
16This attiture is well illustrated in Note, 1 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 860 (1948).
17The factual situation here discussed has provoked considerable comment: see
Notes, 2 A.L.R.2d 880 (1948), 145 A.L.R. 821 (1943), 182 A.L.R. 773 (1941),
L.R.A. 1918A 818 (1918); 14 AuST. L.J. 76 (1940); 26 Mnnr. L. REv. 114
(1941); 16 NoTRE DAmm LAW. 240 (1941); 18 WAsH. L. REv. 215 (1948). For
an analysis of the adoption question in relation to homestead law in Florida, see
Crosby and Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption:
1-111, 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 12, 60 (1949).
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